Introduction
Limited financial market participation is widely documented and challenges classic portfolio allocation theories. Financial innovations aim to improve investors choice set. However, most financial products are not well received by investors at initial stage (Lerner and Tufano (2011) ). Households usually only include a small number of simple securities in their portfolios and many do not invest in financial market at all. Retail structured products, the latest financial innovation, are much more successful than their predecessors in finding their way to household portfolios. Structured products were first introduced in 2001, annual global issuance reached $400 billion by 2007.
1 We use a unique household portfolio allocation data to understand why individual investors are so fond of structured products.
Household investment in structured products is puzzling from the perspectives of typical investor preference and risk-return tradeoffs. First, evidence from U.S., U.K., Germany, Swiss, among others, shows that structured products are massively overpriced (Henderson and Pearson (2011 ), Bergstresser (2009 ), and Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007 ). Investors would long such structured products with negative risk-adjusted return only if there is hedging benefits. However, structured product returns are positively correlated with market return hence cannot be a hedge to typical individual investors. Second, structured products are financial innovations with little historical performance data and much ambiguity. Ambiguity-averse investors would avoid such investments. Third, structured products have capped returns but substantial downside due to default risk. Such feature does not match investors' preference for positive skewness (Barberis and Huang (2008) , Kumar (2009) ).
Structured products are derivative securities issued by financial companies, mostly structured investment vehicles (SIVs). Their payoffs are linked to stock price or credit quality of reference entities. The institutional part of the structured product market consists of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which played a prominent role in the credit crisis. Retail structured products are sold over-the-counter to individuals through commercial banks and investment companies. There is no secondary market for trading of structured retail products. Holders do not have updated valuation prior to maturity date, unless the product is in early redemption due to default or knock-out events. Such features (i.e., illiquidity, fixed maturity, bank transactions) are similar to certificates of deposits (CD) except slightly higher interest rate for structured products.
One potential explanation for individual investors' seemingly suboptimal investments in structured products is that investors misunderstood them. For example, buyers might have mistaken structured products as bank notes. Household investment mistakes have been previously documented by, among others, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) . Given that individual investors with bounded rationality make suboptimal investment decisions, it is important to understand the root behavior leading to such decisions. We conjecture that retail structured product buyers might be influenced by "normalcy bias" or the tendency to neglect bad states which have not occurred previously. This "neglected risks" premise is formally incorporated into a model of financial innovation by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011) .
Empirical examination of investments in retail structured products is limited by data availability. Obtaining transaction information from brokers or banks is difficult for confidentiality reasons. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 provides a rare opportunity for data collection. From 2003 to 2008, Lehman Brothers underwrote a series of "minibonds", formally known as credit-linked notes (CLNs), and distributed through commercial banks in Hong Kong and Singapore (some investors from other places such as Taiwan and Mainland China also purchased through agents). Lehman Brothers also served as swap counterparties for those minibonds. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered a credit event for minibonds and other structured products, including "constellation" notes underwritten by Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) and some privately placed equity-linked notes (ELNs). Individual structured product investors in Hong Kong identified themselves and formed a group to handle their investment losses. We conducted individual interviews with those investors over the period between January and June 2009. Detailed demographic and financial data were compiled for our empirical analysis.
The data provides strong support to the view of "neglected risk" for structured product investment. Bank regulation requires comprehensive assessment of risk profile before individual investors can purchase structured products, and high risk products cannot be sold to low risk-absorbing individuals. However, no risk assessment was documented for 53.6% of our subjects when they signed the purchase agreement. Those "no-doc" buyers invest 9-10% more of their financial wealth into structured products than buyers with full documentation. We use two alternative measures for neglected risk and find similar results.
Many investors claim that they were misled by distributing banks' salespeople. Misselling is conceivable given the commission-driven incentives (Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) ). The feasibility of mis-selling is facilitated by price complexity. Structured products have highly complex payoff terms and conditions. Such complexity can be a strategic choice in security design to exploit consumer surplus as shown by Carlin (2009). We construct price complexity measures and find much higher investments in more complex products. Therefore, product suppliers could have had predatory motives to take advantage of buyers' negligence.
One would expect investors to be cautious and prudent when disbursing their capital. Sophisticated investors are unlikely to forgo risk assessment (or sign a back-dated or forged assessment) when investing in complex products. One driving force for such puzzling act is financial literacy. Prior research has shown that financial literacy is related to under participation in stock market (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) ) and buying high-fee index funds (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) ). We follow prior studies and use cognitive ability and schooling to proxy for financial literacy. We also design a new financial literacy measure using subject's stock market return expectations. Our empirical results are consistent across all three financial literacy measures: financially illiterate investors buy 7-10% more structured products. Moreover, the effect of neglected risk only appears in the group of financially illiterate investors.
Our findings suggest that financial literacy plays a dual role in household finance. First, higher financial literacy leads to better investment choice. Second, financially literate investors are also less likely to be affected by behavioral bias. Our results contrast to Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) who argue that financial literacy by itself has limited effect for better investment outcomes. However, we do not claim that financial literacy can substitute for incentives and supports, as we do not observe changes in financial literacy for our subjects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first provide a brief review of the household finance literature in Section 2. A simple model of investment decision making under local thinking is presented in Section 3. The retail structured product market and product design is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 describes our sampling process and presents the data. Empirical results and robustness check are reported in Section 6 and 7. Section 8 summarizes our findings and concludes.
Related Literature
The investment literature often assumes good behavior from all market players: security issuers design a new product to improve social welfare, financial intermediaries truthfully transmit information about the products, investors understand the product and execute the best strategy. It is an empirical issue whether these conditions are met in reality. The best evidence is from laboratory experiments and field experiments. For example, Charness and Levin's (2005) lab experiments show that investors over-extrapolate from their former experience and tend to follow a suboptimal reinforcement strategy. Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2009) substantiate such result using individual 401(k) investment data. Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) have similar findings for individual IPO investors. Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Eguia and Zame (2009) show that investor's cognitive biases hinder information updating, lead to perceived ambiguity, and cause deviation from rational decision making.
Above studies are on stocks or familiar investment vehicles. The findings may not generalize to financial innovations such as structured products. We examine how individual investors actually make allocation decisions over new illiquid financial products, which is part of household finance that needs more empirical research as advocated by Campbell (2006) . Although Das and Statman (2009) argue that structured products can help improve portfolio allocation, several recent studies suggest that retail structured financial products are persistently overpriced by about eight percent (see Henderson and Pearson (2008), and Bergstresser (2008) ). A natural question is how the issuers get investors to buy large amount of such overpriced products. Investors have little prior knowledge about those investments. Theories on choice under ambiguity would imply zero participation in such case. Hence, market frictions might have existed to defy compliance with theoretical predictions. Subrahmanyam (2009a) shows that financial intermediaries such as distributing banks may delay educating inexperienced individual investors in order to earn more commissions. Moreover, Carlin and Manso (2009) argue that firms may strategically use product complexity to extract consumer surplus. Our empirical results will shed light on the existence of such frictions.
How can individual investors make best investment decisions in a market flourished with financial innovations issued by strategic financial intermediaries? One answer is market selection. Only those good at financial securities (financially literate) should be participating. However, Hilgert, Hogorth and Beverly (2003) , Agrew and Szykman (2005) , National Council on Economic Education's report (NCEE 2005) , show that most Americans fail to understand basic financial concepts and conditions of financial instruments, such as consumer loans and mortgages. More recently, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) report a wide-spread lack of ability on interest compounding among older (50+) individuals in the U.S.. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show a lack of knowledge on debt among all U.S. citizens. Similar problems of low financial literacy are also found in other countries.
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More importantly, lack of financial literacy influences individual suboptimal saving and portfolio choices. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) find that, those who have a better understanding of compound interest, inflation and diversification are more likely to set up plans for retirement. On portfolio choice, less literate investors are less likely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007), Yoong (2007) , Christelis, Jappelli, and, Padula, (2008) ), and less likely to choose mutual funds with lower fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008) ). Similarly, Campbell (2006) reports that individuals with lower income and education level -characteristics that are closely related to financial literacy -are less likely to refinance their mortgages during a period of falling interest rates.
Further studies have shown the channels through which financial literacy works. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) use more than 1000 adults in Germany and find that investor's IQ, which is a usual proxy for cognitive ability, is negatively related to risk aversion and impatience. Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009 a,b) also find that high IQ investors are more likely to participate in stock market, and pick stocks with higher returns using data from Finland. Another conceivable way to improve financial literacy is education. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) argue that "education and the free acquisition of information are important in overcoming the barrier to stockholding erected by ignorance and misperceptions." Similar results is found by Luigi and Jappelli (2005) stocks. In addition, Campbell (2006) suggests that education helps reduce households' entry cost to stock market. He shows that educated households in Sweden diversify their portfolio more efficiently, and can expect higher returns if they participate in stock market. Woodward (2003) reports that college education is associated with a remarkable $1,500 reduction in average broker fees for mortgage loans. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 2008) , Lusardi and Tofano (2009), Stango and Zinman(2009) also suggest that more financial education is needed to improve investors' financial literacy.
However, while it is easy to reach consensus on financial literacy, discontent exists on the effectiveness of education. One discontent is argued by Heckman (2006) that the relationship between cognitive and non-cognitive skills is complex, such that non-cognitive skills and personality traits could cause people to endogenously create environments during childhood that foster faster cognitive development. Education has less effect on cognitive ability when it is given later, an may provide little help on their decision making. Another discontent is about the debate on effectiveness of financial literacy education. Bernheim, Garret, and Maki (2001) show that high school financial literacy training programs will significantly increase individuals' saving rates 5 years after graduation. Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (2009) provide evidence that frequent retirement seminars increase both of individuals' participation rates and contribution rates to savings plans. However, Mandell and Klein (2009) find high school students who have taken financial education do not demonstrate higher levels of financial literacy than those who have not taken such courses. Moreover, Cole and Shastry (2009) suggest that one more year of education will lead to 7.6% more chance to receive positive investment income. But this effect does not come from mandatory financial literacy curriculum in schools, yet, is due to individual's cognitive ability to accomplish the education. The data on Hong Kong household investments in structured financial products provide a good setting for us to investigate above issues. We shed light on investor behavior in a new market of illiquid securities (with plenty of ambiguity). Our results on financial literacy, cognitive abilities, IQ, and education will help resolve some of the theoretical debates.
Our study follows a similar vein as by Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) . They focus on index fund choice by individual investors. Different from their hypothetical investment setting, our subjects made real investments and they might not have had choices. Nevertheless, we both emphasize the importance of financial literacy.
3 A Simple Model of Investments with Local Thinking
Introduction to the Model
Here we present a simple model of investors' assessment about the profitability of investing in structured products, based on what they can recall from available information. In particular, if investor cannot perfectly recall all the possible scenarios related to the profitability, we call this investor has local thinking (see Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010 for a model applied to general cases).
Assume structured products have two sources of risks, common risks, and hidden risks. Assume all investors can observe common risks and are able to link common risks to profitability of the products. We explore the cases when investors cannot observe hidden risks, or cannot link hidden risks to profitability of the products even they observe hidden risks. Before we go to details about the model, here we summarize four cases that we will analyze in this section:
• Case I, benchmark case, where investors can perfectly observe and link both risks to the scenario of losing money in structured products;
• Case II, neglected risks case, where investors due to some reasons (ie. did not go through risk profile assessment) neglected the hidden risks;
• Case III, financially illiterate investor case, where investors, no matter observing or not observing hidden risks, cannot link hidden risks to profitability of the products due to lack of financial literacy;
• Case IV, complex product case, where less complex part of the product is modeled as source of common risks, and more complex part of the product is modeled as source of hidden risks. We conjecture that the complex part is so complicated such that all investors will have problem understanding hidden risks.
The Model
The state of world is defined as 2 dimensional probability space composed of profitability and risks of the structured products. More precisely, we have X = {lose, earn} × {common risks, hidden risks}.
Denote h 1 = (lose, ·); h 2 = (earn, ·);d 1 = (·, common risks); d 2 = (·, hidden risks). as 4 scenarios. Particularly, h 1 means the scenario when investor suffer lose in investments in structured product. Therefore, we have in total 4 elements in the world:
The probabilities of each state is assumed as:
Denote b ≥ 1 as the maximal number of scenarios that the investor can recall per hypothesis. So, b can be either 1 or 2. b = 1 : imperfect recall; b = 2 : perfect recall. Assume investors, based on his acquired information about the risks, use Bayesian update to obtain his posterior of probability that h 1 occurs.
Case I: Benchmark
In this case we assume investor observe both types of risks, and can perfectly recall scenarios related to h 1 . Then we have the true probability on losing in investments in structured products is:
Case II: Neglected Risks
We proxy for neglected risks by the case that investors' risks profile is not not assessed before investing (update to more general argument later). Since the risk profiled is not assessed, investor only obtain common risks of the product, but not the hidden risks. Therefore, his obtained data is {d 1 }, and perceived the probability that h 1 occurs as:
Investor who did not go through risk profile assessment underweight the downside of structured product due to the lack of information.
Case III: Financially Illiterate Investors
For financially illiterate investors, but due to his lack of financial literacy, he can only recall the common risks of the product in his mind, but not the hidden risks, even if he was provided the whole data of the risks (ie. his risk profile has been assessed). Due to this imperfect recall, his perceived probability of h 1 is:
Case IV: Complex Products
Given structured products has several components, we conjecture that risks from the more complex parts of the product are more likely to be left outside of investors' recall. For example, investors maybe quite familiar with the default risks embedded in the collateral part of structured product, which looks similar to a bond, but may not be able to recall the counterparty risks from credit default swap structure, which is in general new to households. Therefore, the complex parts of the security could serve as sources for hidden risks. The more complex the structure is, the less obvious the related hidden risks are. In particular, if the product is extremely complex, then investors' perceived probability of losing money in the product h 1 is:
Hypotheses
Our model is derived from the more general model about local thinking in Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2010). But in their paper, how much can investors (imperfectly) recall from available information is exogenously assumed. In this paper, we explore deeper on what conditions prevent investors from perfectly recall, and propose two possible candidates-financial illiteracy and complexity of products. Based on the results from the model, we form four hypotheses as follow, and empirically examine these hypotheses in later sections.
H0: Structured products are overpriced, and should not be incorporated into household portfolio; H1: Investors who did not go through risk profile assessment incorporate more proportion of structured products into their portfolio (neglected risks bias effect); H2: Effects of neglected risks bias is stronger among financially illiterate investors; H3: Investors invest more in structured products with more complex payoff structure.
Market for Retail Structured Financial Products
Structured financial products, characterized by customized payoff streams and illiquid secondary market, have become increasingly popular investment vehicles. The most well known structured product is probably collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which are the key driver of the recent credit market boom (2005) (2006) (2007) and bust (2007) (2008) (2009) . (See Brunnermeier (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for overviews.) However, given the extremely high requirement of minimal investment in CDOs, individual investors can hardly afford to purchase such products. Structured financial products, characterized by customized payoff streams and illiquid secondary market, have become increasingly popular investment vehicles. The most well known structured product is probably collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which are the key driver of the recent credit market boom (2005) (2006) (2007) and bust (2007) (2008) (2009) . (See Brunnermeier (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for overviews.) However, given the extremely high requirement of minimal investment in CDOs, individual investors can hardly afford to purchase such products. As such, structured products targeting retail investors were created to meet investors' needs. A typical way is to add CDOs (or other derivatives) into the collateral pool of retail structured products, and then sell the retail structured products with a much lower minimal investment threshold.
Retail structured products has been sold to individual investors ever since mid 1990s in Europe, but become noticeable in Hong Kong only after 2003. In the February of 2003, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commissions (SFC) relaxed prospectus rules for unlisted securities, and ignited the retail structured product market. Before the change, issuers of structured products need to register for both programme prospectus and issue prospectus for each issue, even if a series of issues belong to the same programme (eg. minibond 3, minibond 5, ...). Under the new rule of "dual prospectus", issuers only need to register for programme prospectus for the first issue. For the later issues, issuers simply register for issue prospectus but do not need to register for programme prospectus. This largely reduced the cost for issuers to issue products. Another reason for the spring up of retail structured products in Hong Kong is because of the low interest rate around 2003. Due to the low interest rate, bank depositors are eager to find substitutes for saving. The high coupon rate along with the seemingly "safe" feature of some structured products made them attractive to retail investors. These structured products target retail users typically by using well-known companies or popular share issues as reference entities. Some are transparently speculative but others, can be designed to seem conservative in their headline terms, like "minibond" issued by Lehman Brothers. But what surprises us is that the market in Hong Kong dropped much more than that in any other places. In 2009, Hong Kong structured product market faced a 78.7% drop, which is much larger than that in Europe (11.4%), Asia Pacific (37.1%), and North America (44.7%). One potential explanation could be ascribed the fall of Lehman Brothers. Before its bankruptcy, Lehman was one of the most successful in this market with a 35 percent market share and over 33,000 Hong Kong buyers (see Lejot (2008) ). Besides its negative impact to the market, Lehman's bankruptcy has also ignited a conflict between structured product investors and the product distributors. In fact, investors in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were shocked when they were informed of their holdings in retail structured financial product were issued or related to the failed Lehman Brothers.
At the time of Lehman Bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, HKD20.173 billion structured products associated with Lehman were still outstanding in the market from 43,707 investment accounts.
3 Two types of structured products are affected by Lehman bankruptcy: credit-linked note (CLN) and equity-linked note (ELN). The most publicized is "minibond " CLN issued by Lehman Brothers. Another noteworthy CLN is "constellation" issued by Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). Appendix III provides detailed issuance information on minibond and constellation. The investment in these three groups of products take 97% of the total investment in Lehman Brothers related products. Figure 2 shows the structure of CLNs and ELNs. CLNs are medium-term notes with first-to-default feature. Their payouts are based on a group of companies' ("reference entities") credit performance. Those notes normally have 3 to 5 years investment horizon with coupon rates slightly higher than quarterly bank deposit rates. However, the risks of CLNs come from multiple sources. Take minibond series 35 as an example. The first risk is from underlying collateral. When investors purchase the minibond, issuer will use the proceeds collected from investors to buy high quality assets (often to be AAA rated CDOs) as underlying collateral for the minibond. When there is an event of default for collaterals, minibond will be redeemed early at the price based on the proceeds of selling the collateral assets (so called "early redemption amount"), which may be significantly below the principal amount of the minibond outstanding. The second risk is swap counterparty risk. The issuer signs swap contracts to hedge currency risk and interest rate risk. Swap counterparty takes the yields from the underlying collaterals and provides fixed coupon payment to the investors. But when default of swap counterparty occurs, minibond will also be redeemed at the early redemption amount. Finally, the investors' position as insurer in the swap leads to another risk. The swap is based on the credit performance of the reference entities (normally 5 to 8 names).
4 For the case of minibond, the credit rating for these reference entities may range from AA+ to BBB. If any of these reference entity goes bankrupt, fails to pay its liability, or is restructured, minibond will be redeemed at an amount based on selling of the subordinate debt of that troubled reference entity. In this case, investors may lose most of their investments. We summarize the payoff function (gross return) of CLNs, take minibond series 35 for example, as follow:
if issuer exercise call option before maturity date; x : if early redemption event occurs; r j : if credit event occurs to reference entity j; 1 + 5.6% : if nothing happens.
Here i t is the cumulative coupon rate before the day issuer exercise call option; x is the value of collateral regarding to one share of CLNs when early redemption event occurs; r j is the recovery rate of the subordinated notes of the reference entity to which credit event occurs.
For equity-linked notes, as illustrate in Figure 2 , investors also suffer from the underlying collateral risk and swap counterparty risk. The key difference in the structure of ELNs with that of CLNs is that the swap is linked to the stock price of a basket of (normally 3 to 6) companies. Figure 3 shows how the payoff of ELNs is linked to the stock price of the reference companies. Take Pyxis Series 21, an ELN issued by Lehman Brothers in May 2007, for example. The investment horizon of the note is 2.5 years. Coupon will be paid every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. During each of the second to fifth observation dates, there are four auto-calls by the issuer. If the closing price of each reference stock on observation date is at or above 96% of its fixing price (equal to the stock price when the note is issued), the note will be redeemed. This auto-call structure bundled with the fixed coupon rate put a "cap" on the payoff. In the best scenario, investor will get a 20% return when the note matures. However, when the stock price of any linked companies falls below 75% of the fixing price on any day within the 2.5 years, investor will have to wait until the maturity date to get back the principal investment. Moreover, when default of the underlying collateral or swap counterparty occurs, the note will also have to be redeemed early at an amount based on the proceeds of selling the collateral, which may be significantly below the principal.
Unlike those structured products examined by Henderson and Pearson (2008) , retail structured financial products are not listed on any exchange in Hong Kong. All transactions are executed over the counter at distributing banks. Once issued, most of the structured products are not priced until maturity or when knock-out events, such as credit event for CLNs, occur. There is no way to track the performance and market value of such products. Hence, it is difficult for retail investors to form expectation about the risks and returns of such products. There is no secondary market for those products. Initial investors likely have to hold the products till maturity. The relatively long maturity, 3 to 5.5 years for CLNs and 2 years for ELNs, makes investment in such products even riskier. Overall, it seems difficult for investors to get a good handle of such investments. We use survey data to explore the key motives for investors to purchase these products.
Data and Sample Description

Data Collection
We collect data from investors of Lehman related structured products through individual interviews. The interviewers are University of Hong Kong students, mostly Cantonese speakers. The interview will go over a list of items on a questionnaire designed by our-selves. The interviews were conducted during the 11 times of the large protests and gatherings by investors between January 15 and June 18, 2009. Our sample consists of data from 783 structured product investors. The interviewers randomly selected the interviewees and asked questions face-to-face. Our questionnaire has three sections: investment decision environment, investor financial background, and investor demographic characteristics. On March 14, 2009, we revised our questionnaire by adding questions on family monthly income, homeownership, whether they are familiar with salesman, and a question on simple calculation, without changing the original questions. The sample is roughly evenly distributed: 430 investors surveyed before March 14 and 353 investors surveyed after March 14, 2009.
In order to examine sample selection issue, we further interviewed a group of investors who did not invest in Lehman related structured products as control sample. Those interviews were conducted between July 24 and August 10, 2009. We used similar questionnaire, with minor change on the questions in investment decisions. We chose to conduct the surveys in 11 districts of Hong Kong where most of the Lehman structured product investors live to control for geographic factors. We randomly selected 75 investors in those areas, such as from streets, parks, or from railway stations, and obtained similar information on demographic, financial, and investment characteristics. Figure 4 illustrates a pattern of co-movement between total investments in minibonds from the subjects in our sample and Hang Seng Index (HSI), the stock market index in Hong Kong, from July 2, 2003 to June 30, 2008. Presumably investors have more to invest in structured products when equity market condition is good. Notably, as shown in Appendix III, the largest group comes from investors of minibond series 35B issued on February 22, 2008, at a time financial crisis was going strong. However, as by Souleles (2009) that when market condtion goes down, investors are more likely to shun away from purchasing securities for the purpose of hedging. Table I presents descriptive statistics of our key variables (definitions are given in Appendix I). Respondents report the name of the structured products they purchased and the proportion of their total financial wealth that they invested in the structured products. Their average monthly income is HKD16,499. On average, each investor invests 60% of financial wealth in such products. Only 25% of the subjects ever bought lottery tickets. Investors on average hold 7% of stocks, 82% own properties. About 54% of the investors went through risk profile assessment documentation, 37% were not familiar with the salesperson. Interestingly, when we compare our sample with two major survey sample in Hong Kong 5 , we find that investors in our sample are in general older and contains more women than men. But in terms of education and financial characteristics, investors in our sample are quite similar to the other two samples. Appendix II reports the details of this comparison.
Sample Description
Our sample contains all of the three main structured products that are related to Lehman Brothers, namely Minibond, Constellation and equity-linked notes (ELN hereafter). The differences between ELN investors and CLN investors are substantial. ELN investors are better educated, with 2 more years of education on average, and more affluent than CLN investors in both total financial wealth and family monthly income. The average self-reported investment proportions by investors of each group are all above 50%. Financial and demographic characteristics show that these investors are basically senior and poorly educated people. The average age is above 55; more than 70% of them are retired, and only 15% attended college. About two thirds of them cannot do simple interest rate compounding calculation.
A key variable for our analysis is whether investor has gone through risk profile assessment done by distributing banks before purchasing the structured products. About 54% of investors did not go through it. By giving up this risk profile assessment, investor is potentially losing a best chance to understand what kind of risks are embedded in the structured products, especially the risks related to extreme economy scenarios (like bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers). Investors' connection with salesperson and neighborhood seems to capture their neglected risk bias, too. If investor is more closely acquainted with salesperson, he or she may obtain more information about the risk of the structured products from chatting with the salesperson. It is the similar case when he or she participate in neighborhood activities -he may have a higher probability of getting information about some risk he neglected. In our sample, 66% investors are acquainted with the salesperson. The salesperson could be either a close friend of the investor or a client manager that has helped the investor for several years. 42% investors engaged in neighborhood activities.
Another set of variables which is equal important is measures of financial literacy. Aside from the ability of interest compounding and schooling, we form another measure of financial literacy rational rational expectation approach. We adopt investor's selfreported expectation of Hong Kong stock market annual return, and use it as a proxy for financial literacy. Among the 353 interviewees we asked for their expectation, 159 cannot answer. The histogram of answers from the other 194 investors is plotted in Figure 5 . Unsurprisingly, investors tend to choose sentimental numbers such as 0% (25 responses), 5% (30 responses), 10% (48 responses), 20% (20 responses), but there is also wide dispersion among the answers. Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the wealth invested in structured financial products is high in groups sorted on their stock return expectation. The investment proportions are all higher than 50%. However, those who can give more reasonable expectation to Hong Kong stock market annual return (the third group) on average put less proportion of wealth in purchasing structured financial products.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows that the proportion of financially literate investors decreases as the investors' investment proportion increases. Among those who have invested less than half of their wealth in structured products, there are significantly more literate investors than non-literate investors. However, this difference decreased and reversed in the group of people who invested more than half of their wealth in structured products. Panel C of Figure 6 shows that investment proportion in structured products first increase and then decrease as we move from low income investors to high income investors. Investors of middle income level invest more proportion of wealth in structured products. Within each group, the financially illiterate investors invest more proportion of their wealth than literate investors. Table II reports the effect of neglected risks on investment proportion in structured financial products. Our key measure for neglected risk captures whether investor had gone through risk profile assessment before purchasing the products. By giving up this risk profile assessment, investor is potentially losing a best opportunity to understand what kind of risks are embedded in the structured products, especially the risks related to extreme economy scenarios (like global financial crisis or bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers). Mode 1 reports a positive significant univariate effect of giving up risk profile assessment on investment proportion in structured products. Neglected risks bias by itself gives adjusted R 2 as large as 2%.
Empirical Results on Allocation
Neglected Risks Bias and Investment Allocation
Mode 2 of Table II shows the baseline effect of household investors' background and market condition on investments. Not surprisingly, higher income family, and family that owns their own house put less proportion of their wealth in structured products. Interestingly, interest rate, which is captured by 1 year HIBOR, 6 is significantly negatively correlated with investment proportion. this is consistent with our conjecture that investors misunderstood structured products as low risk savings. Therefore, when interest rate goes down, structured products, bearing the feature of constant cash flows, become a good alternative.
Mode 3 of Table II reports the incremental effect of neglected risks bias. By comparing mode 3 and mode 2, we have the adjusted R 2 increased by 3%. The marginal effect of neglected risk bias increased to 10%. On average, if investors did not go through risk profile assessment, they would buy 10% more of structured products. To provide more robustness on the effect of neglected risks bias on investments in structured products, we adopt two more alternative measures of neglected risks. Investors' lack of connection with salesperson or neighborhood seems to capture their neglected risks bias, too. If investor is more closely acquainted with salesperson, he or she may obtain more information about the risk of the structured products from chatting with the salesperson. It is similar case when he or she participate in neighborhood activities-he may have a higher probability of getting information about some risks he neglected. Table III shows that the neglect risks bias effect remains, either measured by investors' relation with salesperson (mode 1-3), or by neighborhood activity engagement (mode 4-6). The magnitude of the marginal effect is around 6% to 10%.
Effect of Sell Side Product Complexity
From above discussion, there is clear evidence that investors' neglected risks bias affects their investment decision making. Financial institutions should be able to anticipate this bias. But how can they gain profits from this bias is a practical issue. Recent literature (Carlin 2009) show that institutions may strategically make their products complex to extrapolate consumer surplus. Creating complexity, in our setting, prevents investors from fully understanding the structure of the products. Therefore, there could be a higher possibility that investors misunderstood the risks behind the products, and neglected risks bias are induced. We examine this issue by analyzing the complex feature of structured products in our sample.
Our first measure of complexity is the dispersion of credit rating of reference entity of CLNs. Normally, a CLN will have 3 to 8 reference entities, which are typically big companies either in Hong Kong or outside. Any of the reference entities has credit event (e.g. default), the CLN will be redeemed and at the value equal to the subordinate bond of the defaulted reference entity, which could be much less than principal. Therefore, been able to understand the credit rating criteria becomes important to CLN investors. However, for issuers of CLN, choosing six reference entities with credit rating as AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, put s much more complexity to investors than choosing six reference entities with rating A for each. We conjecture that larger dispersion of the credit rating will lead to more complexity, and a higher chance to induce investors' neglected risks bias. Table IV , mode 1-3, report this effect. Mode 1 shows that higher dispersion of credit rating has a strong positive effect on investment proportion in structured products. Mode 2 and mode 3 focus on interaction terms. The effect goes a little weak, but remains. The R 2 increased to 11%.
Our second measure of complexity is the currency tranche. Each series of CLN has at least two tranches: HKD tranche, and USD tranche. Since in Hong Kong, HKD is dominating the market, why would institutions combine exchange risk with the CLN which is already complex in structure. We use currency as another measure of complexity, and found similarly positive and significant results.
Financial Literacy and Neglected Risks
Given there is a chance that institutions may strategically use price complexity to induce investors' neglected risk bias, will investors' financial literacy help attenuate the bias effects? We adopt three measures of financial illiteracy and examine the effect interactions terms of financial illiteracy and neglected risks. All the three interaction terms are significant as shown in Table V . In mode 2, adding the coefficient for neglected risk and coefficient for interaction term, we got neglected risk is 1.5 times stronger for investors who do not understand compound interest rate is higher than simple interest rate. Similar from the other two financial illiteracy measures in mode 3-4, and mode 5-6. Table VI reports the joint effect of regressing investment proportion in structured products on neglected risks bias, price complexity, and financial illiteracy. When putting together, we can explain 15% of variation of investment proportion.
Robustness Checks and Alternative Interpretations
Our above results on neglected risks, financial illiteracy, and product complexity could be driven by a specific group of investors or product. In this section, we explore whether those effects vary across different sample selection criterion. By doing so we can verify the robustness of our prior findings as well as explore new implications within subgroups.
Subgroup by Age
We separate our sample into two groups by age. Korniotis and Kumar (2009) examine the role of age in investment performance, and show that older people are better in understanding financial knowledges but no better in timing the market. Neglected risks and financial literacy may play different role under different conditions. Indeed, as shown in Table VII , we find that effect of neglected risks, measured by risk profile not assessed, are stronger for the group of investors aged below 57. Those effects are insignificant or weak for investors aged 57 or above. Similar results for the effect of financial illiteracy, measured by education below high school. These findings are consistent with Korniotis and Kumer (2009) in the sense that older investors acquired more financial knowledge from experience, and are investing with more caution even if they did not go through risk profile assessment or have low education background. Notably, the R 2 s for each subgroup regression (11% and 12%) are close the R 2 for the regression with whole sample (13% in mode 5 of Table VI ). This supports that our separation of the sample is not biased.
Subgroup by Household Income
We also examine effect of neglected risks, and financial illiteracy in subgroups by their household incomes. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) discusses whether irrational behavior would disappear with wealth. On the other hand, traditional economic theory suggests that wealthier investors tend to be less risk averse. In this analysis, we separate our sample by the median of household monthly income in our sample, which is 10,100 $HKD 7 .
Mode 1 to 3 report the effect on the households that have income below 10,100 $HKD, and mode 4 to 6 report the effect on the households that have income above 10,100 $ HKD. The effect of neglected risks does not show too much difference on low income households and high income households. However, the effect of financial illiteracy is much stronger among high income households than from low income households. One possible explanation could be the illiterate wealthy investors beard excessive risks for pursuing high returns.
Determinants of Neglected Risks Bias
In Table IX , we attempt to understand the driving factors of neglected risks bias. Specifically, we run probit regression of investors' backgrounds on their behavioral of not taking risk profile assessment. We find that the exogenous measure of investors' financial literacy-education below high school, is has significant explanatory power. Investors' preference for lottery and household indebtedness also contributes positively to investors' neglected risks behavior. In total, we have an explanatory power as large as 0.07 represented by pseudo R 2 .
Summary and Conclusion
Individual investors in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore bought substantial amount of structured products which turned out to be CDOs in disguise, as revealed by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. It is difficult to justify initial investment decisions in retail structured products from standard rational theories as those investors had little prior knowledge. We show that neglected risk has strong explanatory power for household asset allocation in structured products. Allocation is lower when the investment is made more prudently with fully documented risk assessment. Investors allocation is related to product complexity. The effect of neglected risk on structured product investment is weaker for more financially literate investors.
This paper also demonstrates the importance of financial literacy for investment decisions. Consistent with prior studies, our evidence suggests that improving investor financial literacy is important for reducing neglected risks bias, and therefore, preventing excessive demand (and issuance) for financial innovation.
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing debate on root causes of the credit crisis in [2007] [2008] [2009] . If investors did not knowingly pursue investments in structured products, the investment banks manufacturing such products are more likely to be the culprit of the market development and the amplification of the crisis. The investment horizon for the note is 2.5 years. Coupon will be paid every half a year after issuance at the observation dates. There are four auto-calls by the issuer on each of the second to the fifth observation dates. Valuation date is equal to the fifth observation date-about 2.5 years after issue date. When the swap between issuer and swap counterparty is terminated prior to maturity date, the note will be redeemed at a price based on the proceeds of selling the underlying collateral, which may be significantly below the principal of the note. For Pyxis Series 21, the underlying collateral is European Medium-Term Notes issued by Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V. . We also constructed and tested an alternative measure of financial illiteracy according to a more stringent region [7%, 17%] as shown in the figure as "Literate Proxy 2". The result for the alternative measure, not reported in the paper, is quite similar to the first measure "Stock Categorization = 0". 
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(1) Risk profile not assessed The sample comprises household investors who invested in structured financial products during 2003 and 2008 . The dependent variable is the proportion of wealth that the investor invested in structured products. The independent variables are a measure of neglected risks, Risk Profile Not Assessed, and control variables including investors' background and market condition when investment was made. The Risk Profile Not Assessed variable equals one for investors who did go through risk profile assessment by distributing banks before purchasing structured products. Income measures the household monthly income by $1,000 HKD. Hang Seng Index Return is the return of Hang Seng Index in the last three month before investments were made. This table reports the interaction of neglected risks bias and pricing complexity. The dependent variable is proportion of wealth invested in structured financial products. The independent variables are Risk Profile Not Assessed, which is a measure of neglected risks bias, two pricing complexity measures (other Credit Rating, or Foreign Currency), and control variables.Credit Rating equals one if the range of credit rating among reference entities are larger than four rating levels (eg. Minibond Series 12 has six reference entities, among which the highest rating is A+ and lowest is BBB). See Appendix I for detailed definition. Foreign Currency equals one if investor purchased to USD or AUD tranche, instead of HKD tranche, of the structured products. This table reports the joint effect neglected risks, pricing complexity, and financial literacy (illiteracy) on investments in structured financial products. The dependent variable is the proportion of wealth the investor invested in structured financial products. The Risk Profile Not Assessed variable equals one for investors who did go through risk profile assessment by distributing banks before purchasing structured products. Credit Rating equals one if the range of credit rating among reference entities are larger than four rating levels (eg. Minibond Series 12 has six reference entities, among which the highest rating is A+ and lowest is BBB This table reports the effects of neglected risks and financial literacy on investments in structured products in subgroups of investors specified by their age. The median of investors' age is 57. Mode 1 to 3 report the effect on those who are not older than 57, and mode 4 to 6 report the effect on those who are older than 57.
Investor Age Above or Equal Median
Investor Age Below Median This table reports the effects of neglected risks and financial literacy on investments in structured products in subgroups of investors specified by their household monthly income. The median of household income is 10,100$ HKD. Mode 1 to 3 report the effect on the households that have income below 10,100 $ HKD, and mode 4 to 6 report the effect on the households that have income above 10,100 $ HKD. 
Appendix II Sample Comparison
The table compares demographic and financial background of investors in our survey sample and those in two major surveys in Hong Kong. The data for our sample were collected by questionnaire survey. We focus on Hong Kong investors who had purchased credit-linked note or equity-linked note during 
